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Abstract In this issue, Elizabeth Shaw and Gulzaar
Barn offer a number of replies to my arguments in
‘Criminal Rehabilitation Through Medical Interven-
tion: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integ-
rity’, Journal of Ethics (2014). In this article I re-
spond to some of their criticisms.
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Chemical castration
Brain-active drugs and other interventions that
exert a direct chemical or physical influence on
the brain are sometimes imposed by criminal jus-
tice systems, on criminal offenders, for the pur-
poses of facilitating offender rehabilitation. I call
such interventions neurocorrectives.
In existing ethical debate on neurocorrectives, it has
often been assumed that they could only permissibly be
used with the consent of the offender. In my article
‘Criminal Rehabilitation ThroughMedical Intervention:
Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity’ I
challenged this view [1].1 Perhaps the most obvious
reason for thinking that nonconsensual neurocorrectives
are impermissible is that they violate the offender’s right
to bodily integrity. I sought to undermine this thought by
drawing an ethical comparison between the interference
with bodily integrity involved in nonconsensual
neurocorrectives, and the interference with freedom of
movement and association involved in incarceration. I
suggested that, on the assumption that incarceration is
permissible despite the severe constraints on movement
and association that it involves, it is doubtful that
neurocorrectives are impermissible in virtue of the in-
terference with bodily integrity that they involve.
In fact, my assumption that incarceration is permissible
was restricted to a particular, hypothetical kind of incar-
ceration, which I called ‘minimal incarceration’. Minimal
incarceration would consist in holding offenders
in institutions that placed serious and constant con-
straints on free movement and association, but oth-
erwise exposed offenders to no greater risks to their
health and security than average members of the
unincarcerated citizenry, and took all reasonable
steps to safeguard opportunities for political partic-
ipation, legal representation and education (p. 105).
I assumed that it is sometimes permissible to subject
criminal offenders to minimal incarceration, notwith-
standing the interference with freedom of movement
and association that this involves. It is very doubtful,
however, whether it would be permissible to subject
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comparable nonoffenders to minimal incarceration. This
suggests that committing certain types of crimes renders
one morally liable to minimal incarceration, for in-
stance, by weakening, waiving or activating an excep-
tion clause in one’s rights to freedom of movement and
association. But if this is so, we might wonder whether
committing those same crimes could also render one
morally liable to the forms of bodily interference in-
volved in nonconsensual neurocorrectives, for instance,
byweakening, waiving or activating an exception clause
in one’s rights to bodily integrity.
The challenge for the opponent of neurocorrectives is
to explain why criminal offending deprives rights to
freedom of movement and association of their normal
protective force, but does not similarly deprive the right
to bodily integrity of its protective force. I argued that
the three most promising attempts to meet this challenge
fail. I thus tentatively concluded that, if minimal incar-
cerat ion is permissible, then nonconsensual
neurocorretives are not impermissible in virtue of the
kind of bodily interference that they involve.
Two papers in this issue raise a number of objections to
my argument, and I am grateful to their authors—Eliza-
beth Shaw and Gulzaar Barn—for subjecting it to critical
scrutiny [2, 3]. In this article, I respond to some of their
objections, beginning with those offered by Shaw.
Shaw makes many careful and incisive criticisms. I
do not have space to respond to all of them here, and in
any case I do not have a response to all of them.
However, I would like to raise some problems with what
I take to be her four most powerful critiques.
Shaw on The Epidemic Case
Much of my paper was spent assessing the robustness
claim:
It takes more serious criminal offending for the
rights to bodily integrity that protect against injec-
t ion [the method via which I assumed
neurocorrectives would be administered] to lose
their protective force than for the rights to free
movement and association that protect against
minimal incarceration to lose theirs (p. 110).
If the robustness claim holds, then committing a crime
could render one liable to the restrictions on free move-
ment and association involved in minimal incarceration
without also rendering one liable to the forms of bodily
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n v o l v e d i n n o n c o n s e n s u a l
neurocorrectives—namely, the injection of a drug. How-
ever, I argued that there is no good reason to think that the
robustness claim holds. For instance, I suggested that
appealing to first-order case-based moral intuitions does
not clearly support it. I considered what Shaw calls the
epidemic case:
Jill is infected with a novel strain of the Ebola
virus, which could, if it spread, infect and kill
many people. The only way to stop it spreading
is to keep her in quarantine for three months, and,
since Jill does not agree to this, the quarantine
would have to be imposed against her will.
Jane is infected with a novel strain of the Ebola
virus which could, if it spreads, kill many people.
The only way to stop the virus spreading is to
inject Jane with a drug. This drug will not cure
Jane’s infection, but it will prevent the virus from
infecting others. Jane does not agree to receive the
injection, so it will need to be imposed against her
will (p. 112, italics in original).
And I claimed that
it is not intuitively clear that the threshold for inter-
vention should be higher in the case of Jane than in
the case of Jill (pp. 112-13, italics in original)
where the ‘threshold for intervention’was supposed to
be the degree of harm that the virus would have to cause
for the imposition of the intervention to be justified.2
I took this intuition to be significant since, if rights to
bodily integrity were generally more robust than rights
to freedom of movement and association, one might
expect that a larger potential catastrophe would be
2 Shaw interprets me as making a claim about the relative strength
of the rights at stake in these cases, and rightly worries that one
cannot straightforwardly infer anything about the robustness of a
right from its strength. One cannot infer from the fact that both
rights (to bodily integrity, and to freedom of movement and
association) can be overridden in these cases, that the threshold
for overriding them (i.e. the size of the averted-catastrophe that is
required) is the same. I agree. But Shaw’s worry here is based on a
misunderstanding; my intuitive conclusion about these cases was
not about whether these rights can be overridden, and thus was not
about their strength, but was precisely about where the threshold
for overriding them lies. I suggested that Bit is not intuitively clear
that the threshold for intervention should be higher in the case of
Jane than in the case of Jill^ (pp. 112–13, this emphasis not in
original).
Douglas T.
required to justify infringement of the former than to
justify infringement of the latter.
Emergency and Non-Emergency Situations
Shaw raises two chief concerns regarding my appeal to
this case. First, she notes that the case involves an
emergency, in the sense that it involves a threat that is
both grave and imminent. By contrast, she suggests,
contexts in which we would consider imposing minimal
incarceration or neurocorrectives are not emergency
situations, since the offender poses a threat that is non-
grave, non-imminent, or both. Thus, even if the rights to
freedom of movement and association and bodily integ-
rity at stake in the epidemic case are equally robust, this
may imply little about the comparable rights at stake in
criminal justice cases. It may be that
(i) the right to bodily integrity that protects against the
injection of a drug is, in emergency situations, no
more robust that one’s right to freedom of move-
ment and association that protects against minimal
incarceration
but that
(ii) the right to bodily integrity that protects against the
injection of a drug is, in non-emergency situations,
more robust that one’s right to freedom of move-
ment and association that protects against minimal
incarceration.
I agree that this is possible. However, I do not believe
that it undermines the point I was attempting to make with
the epidemic case, which was simply that intuitive reac-
tions to that case do not clearly support the robustness
claim—that the epidemic case does not serve as a counter-
example tomy rejection of the claim. If, as Shaw suggests,
intuitions regarding emergency situations do not have any
bearing on the robustness claim, which Shaw takes to
refer to the rights that obtain in non-emergency situations,
this will strengthen my point; it will suggest that appeals
to the epidemic case never had any prospect of grounding
persuasive objections to the claim.
Shaw’s criticism appears to be grounded on the
thought that I was invoking the epidemic case in posi-
tive support for the robustness claim, whereas in fact it
was playing a purely negative role. But it is interesting
to consider whether it might play a positive role.
Suppose one had the intuition about the epidemic case
that the threshold for interference is precisely the same
for Jill’s quarantine as it is for Jane’s forced treatment.
Would this provide positive support for the robustness
claim? Shaw appears to doubt this on the basis of the
disanalogy that she has identified. But I am inclined to
think that it would provide some positive support. Even
though it is possible that (i) and (ii) both hold—i.e., that
the relative robustness of the rights in question varies
between emergency and non-emergency situations—
there is at least some reason to suppose that they do
not. There is, that is, some reason to suppose that con-
clusions about the relative robustness of these rights in
emergency situations will carry over to non-emergency
situations, and visa versa. This is because it is very
unclear, theoretically, why the emergency/non-
emergency distinction should make a moral difference.
It seems to me, then, that, notwithstanding possible
moral differences between emergency and non-
emergency situations, the epidemic case could provide
some positive support for the robustness claim. Howev-
er, I do not wish to claim that it does provide such
support, because I do not myself have a clear intuition
that the threshold for interference is the same for both
quarantine and forced treatment in the epidemic case
(though nor do I have a clear intuition that the thresholds
are different). I thus prefer to stick to my initial, negative
claim: that the epidemic case does not constitute a
counterexample to my rejection the robustness claim.
At this point, Shaw might argue that there is a further
problem: I have not considered the most promising type
of counterexample to my view. Given the potential
moral differences between emergency and non-
emergency situations, I should have considered poten-
tial counter-examples that, like the relevant criminal
justice cases, involve non-emergency situations.
This raises the question whether Shaw is right to
think that criminal justice cases are not emergency situ-
ations. I am not sure that she is. Notice that in some
cases where offenders are now incarcerated they do, or
would if released, pose a grave and imminent threat to
others. We might consider here cases in which a person
in the late stages of planning a major terrorist attack or
mass murder is identified and incarcerated, and will
likely carry out the attack if released. Such a case might
be quite closely analogous to my epidemic case.
Notice also that in some cases of slow-moving epi-
demics, decisions about quarantine and forced treatment
do not involve an imminent threat (though the threat will
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almost always be a grave one). We could construct a
variant of the epidemic case where the threat is grave but
non-imminent. Such a case would be analogous, in
terms of the gravity and imminence of the threat, to
quite a few criminal justice cases, and I believe that
my intuitive conclusions about the original epidemic
case would hold for this variant case as well.
Nevertheless, I do agree with Shaw that my argument
would have been strengthened by considering a broader
range of potential counter-examples, including some
that clearly involve non-emergency situations.
Two-Option versus Three-Option Cases
Shaw’s second worry about the epidemic case is that it
involves two separate comparisons between two options,
rather than one comparison between three options. In the
case of Jill, we are asked to compare quarantine (i.e.,
constraints on freedom of movement and association)
with no quarantine, while in the case of Jane we are asked
to compare the injection (an interference with bodily
integrity) with no injection. Shaw rightly points out that
in typical criminal justice cases there will instead be three
options: constraints on freedom of movement and associ-
ation (in this case via incarceration), interference with
bodily integrity (for example, via injection of a
neurocorrective), or neither. She fears that this disanalogy
might prevent my conclusions about the epidemic case
from carrying over to the criminal justice cases of interest.
Again, I agree that the disanalogy Shaw identifies is
potentially morally significant. It could be that conclu-
sions about the robustness of the relevant rights in two-
option cases do not carry over to three-option cases. But
I am inclined to respond to this precisely as I responded
to the emergency/non-emergency disanalogy. First, if
Shaw is right that one cannot make inferences about
three-option cases from two-option cases, this will
merely strengthen my claim that the epidemic case does
not constitute a persuasive objection to the robustness
claim. And, second, there is in fact some reason to
believe that conclusions regarding two-option cases will
carry over to three-option cases, meaning that there
remains a possibility that the epidemic case could pro-
vide positive support for the robustness claim (though I
would not wish to commit myself to this view).
Again, Shaw might argue that, if I wanted to consider
the strongest potential objections to the robustness claim, I
should have considered potential counterexamples that
are as closely analogous as possible to actual criminal
justice scenarios in which the use of neurocorrectives
might be at issue. Thus, I should have considered three-
option cases rather than two-option ones.
I believe, however, that there is in fact good reason
to prefer two-option examples when assessing the
robustness claim; three-option cases introduce a com-
plication that we would do well to exclude, namely,
they invite the thought that we could impose a dis-
junctive requirement on the offender—a requirement
to accept either restrictions on free movement and
association or bodily interference. Consider a case in
which either quarantining an individual or subjecting
him to treatment would avert an infectious disease
catastrophe. The authorities thus face a choice in
which the alternatives include imposing quarantine,
imposing treatment, and imposing neither. Even if
not stipulated as a further option (indeed, even if
explicitly excluded), we might be tempted to think,
regarding such a case, that the state could also enter-
tain a fourth option: require that the infected individual
either undergo quarantine, or receive treatment, with
the choice left to that individual. Moreover, it might
generally seem that imposing this disjunctive require-
ment would be preferable to imposing either quaran-
tine or treatment without the individual being given
any choice, since the disjunctive requirement leaves
the individual with greater personal autonomy. Sup-
pose that our intuition about this case was that it
would never be permissible to impose quarantine or
treatment without giving any choice, but it would,
above some threshold level of harm averted, be per-
missible to impose the disjunctive requirement: quar-
antine or treatment. What would this show about the
relative robustness of the right to free movement and
association, and the right to bodily integrity? Would it
suggest that these rights are equally robust? Not nec-
essarily. It could be, for example, that the following
hold: (i) the right to freedom of movement and asso-
ciation is less robust, so that it would, absent the
possibility of imposing a disjunctive requirement, take
a lesser catastrophe to justify impositions on freedom
of movement and association than to justify interfer-
ence with bodily integrity, but (ii) it is always prefer-
able to impose the disjunctive requirement to imposing
either quarantine or treatment alone, so that once the
threshold for imposing quarantine is met, we should
offer the alternative of treatment as well. Given this
sort of possibility, it is difficult to draw conclusions
about the robustness claim from three-option cases.
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Shaw’s Examples
Having argued I should have considered three-option
cases that involve non-emergencies, Shaw then offers
two such cases, and suggests these cases do tell against
the robustness claim. The first of these cases is her
discipline scenario:
The parents of Anne, who is 11 years old, discover
that she is engaging in highly risky behaviour.
Assume that there are two forms of discipline that
are likely to prevent Anne from continuing to take
these risks – grounding her or administering cor-
poral punishment - and that they will probably be
equally effective. Which option is preferable?
1. Allow Anne to engage in highly risky behav-
iour without any interference.
2. Ground Anne (i.e. interfere with free
movement).
3. Administer corporal punishment to Anne (i.e.
interfere with bodily integrity). (Shaw 2016, this
issue)
Shaw suggests that Bgrounding is the best option,
corporal punishment the next best, and doing nothing
the worst option^ (Shaw 2016, this issue). I agree. I also
intuit that the threshold for grounding, in terms of the level
of risk required to justify it, is lower than for corporal
punishment. However, I do not think this counts against
the robustness claim.
An initial difficulty is that the kind of bodily interfer-
ence involved in this case is different from the kind of
bodily interference that I was interested in and to which
the robustness claim refers: the injection of a drug. I
argued that the rights to bodily integrity that protect
against different kinds of bodily interference may differ
in their robustness. If this is correct, it may be that the
that the right to bodily integrity at stake in corporal
punishment is more robust than the right to free move-
ment and association involved in grounding (or, for that
matter, incarceration), but that the right to bodily integ-
rity that protects against neurointerventions (viz.,
against the injection of a drug) is not similarly robust.
A further, and I think more serious, problem is that
there are many ways of accommodating the intuition
that the threshold for the permissible imposition of
grounding is lower than the threshold for the permissible
use of corporal punishment that do not require us to
accept the robustness claim, because they do not invoke
a right to bodily integrity. Shaw concedes herself that the
threshold for corporal punishment may be higher be-
cause corporal punishment is more distressing, or (we
may assume) less effective than grounding. I would add
that it may be higher because it involves the intentional
infliction of pain, which neither grounding, nor the
injection of a drug (the kind of bodily interference that
I was interested in) necessarily does.
Shaw goes on to provide the driving scenario:
Joe has a medical condition that causes him un-
predictably to lose consciousness while driving.
He lives in an isolated cottage in a remote area and
relies on his car to meet friends and participate in
activities he enjoys (although he does have access
to medical and emergency services and can get
food delivered etc. without his car). Imagine that
the authorities only have the following three
options. Which option is preferable?
1. Allow Joe to put other road users at risk, with-
out any interference.
2. Compel Joe to stop driving.
3. Forcibly inject Joe with a drug that does not
treat his underlying illness, but does prevent him
from losing consciousness for the duration of his
car journeys. (Shaw 2016, this issue)
Shaw believes that it would be better to compel Joe to
stop driving than to forcibly inject him with the drug. I
agree, and I also believe that the threshold for justifying
a driving prohibition is lower than that for justifying
forced imposition of the drug. But again, I believe all of
this can be explained without accepting the robustness
claim.
In this case, I believe the problem lies not in Shaw’s
analogue for the bodily interference involved in
neurocorrectives, but in her analogue for the constraints
on movement and association involved in minimal in-
carceration. Minimal incarceration clearly involves con-
straints that would, if imposed on an innocent person,
violate that person’s right to freedom of movement and
association. By contrast, it is not clear to me that com-
pelling Joe to stop driving involves such a rights-viola-
tion, notwithstanding Joe’s reliance on the use of a car to
move around and maintain his associations. The reason
for this is that the right to freedom of movement and
association does not entail a duty on others to provide all
means necessary to move and associate as one would
like, or even as most people can. To see this, suppose
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that Joe’s brother John lives in an equally isolated place
and is equally reliant on a car for movement and asso-
ciation. John has no medical condition, however he is
very poor and can only afford to buy cars that are not
roadworthy and pose a serious danger to others. It seems
doubtful that the state violates John’s right to freedom of
movement and association by prohibiting him from
driving such dangerous vehicles.
I admit that, in the case of Joe, there may be a stronger
basis for saying that a prohibition on driving would
constitute a violation of his right to freedom of movement
than there is in the case of John. However, it seems to me
that there is nevertheless considerable scope for doubt as
to whether there is any such rights violation in this case,
and this may reasonably colour our intuitions about the
driving scenario. It may make prohibiting Joe from using
a car seem substantially less problematic than subjecting
him to the kinds of constraints on movement and associ-
ation involved in minimal incarceration.
Shaw on Harm and Threats to Agency
Besides an appeal to intuition, I considered two other
ways in which my imagined opponent might seek to
defend the robustness claim—the claim that it takes
more serious criminal offending for the rights to bodily
integrity that protect against injection to lose their pro-
tective force than for the rights to free movement and
association that protect against minimal incarceration to
lose theirs. The first strategy would be to appeal to harm;
one could argue that the sort of bodily interference
involved in nonconsensual neurcorrectives (by assump-
tion, the injection of a drug) is, or is typically, more
harmful than the kinds of restrictions on free movement
and association involved in minimal incarceration, so
we should expect the rights that protect against it to be
more robust. The second, more Kantian, strategy would
be to appeal to agency; one could argue that the relevant
kinds of bodily interference are (typically) more threat-
ening to agency than the relevant restrictions on free
movement and association. I argued that neither strategy
succeeds, but Shaw comes to the defence of both.
Harm
Regarding the appeal to harm, Shaw cites a study which
found that psychiatric inpatients tended to prefer com-
pulsory seclusion or physical restraint to compulsory
treatment [4]. She takes this to suggest that they
regarded minimal incarceration-like constraints on free
movement and association as less harmful than bodily
intrusions of the sort involved in forced treatment.
It seems to me doubtful that this evidence supports
the robustness claim. First, these patients may have
regarded forced treatment as more harmful not because
of the bodily intrusion that it entailed, but in virtue of the
mental intrusion involved. In that case, this evidence
would, if anything, support a robust right to mental
integrity, not to bodily integrity. Second, the patients
may have objected to forced treatment because they
perceived it to havemore side-effects than is now typical
for the injection of a drug; it is important to note that the
study cited by Shaw was conducted on Swiss psychiat-
ric patients hospitalized in 1981, a time at which psy-
chiatric medications were typically less safe that they are
today. Third, seclusion may have been seen as involving
less harm than compulsory treatment because, in the
context of psychiatric hospitalization, compulsory se-
clusion arguably did not involve a dramatic reduction in
freedom of movement and association, which was al-
ready highly constrained. It is not clear that the differ-
ence between psychiatric hospitalization and seclusion,
in terms of constraints on bodily and mental integrity, is
comparable to the difference between minimal incarcer-
ation and non-incarceration.
Threats to Agency
Consider now the second strategy for defending the
robustness claim—the appeal to ‘threats to agency’. I
distinguished two different ways in which an interven-
tion might threaten an individual’s agency (pp. 115–16).
First, it might constitute a communicative threat to
agency, by expressing a denial of, or disregard for, the
recipient’s agency. Second, it might constitute a causal
threat to agency, by (expectably) resulting in a reduction
in the recipient’s agency or sense of agency. I argued
that there is no good reason to suppose that interferences
with bodily integrity of the sort involved in nonconsen-
sual neurocorrectives would, or would typically, consti-
tute a greater communicative or causal threat to agency
than restrictions on freedom of movement and associa-
tion of the sort involved in minimal incarceration.
In defending this view, I appealed to the thought that
bodily interference of the relevant kind would express a
thoroughgoing disregard for the agency of the recipient
only if the perpetrator of the intervention actually had an
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attitude of thoroughgoing disregard for the agency of the
recipient. Shaw challenges this suggestion, arguing that
certain interventions ‘objectively’—or at least, indepen-
dently of the contingent subjective states of the perpe-
trator—express disregard for agency, or, as she prefers
to put it, express disrespect. She gives, as examples of
interventions that express such disrespect, flogging,
rape, and performing a surgical procedure on someone
without their consent. Shaw thinks that bodily interfer-
ence of the sort involved in nonconsensual
neurocorrectives belongs in this category too, and sug-
gests that it might be comparable, in terms of disrespect
expressed, to mild non-public flogging.
I concede that the messages expressed by our actions
may to some extent be independent of the contingent
attitudes of the actor. However, I am nevertheless unsure
whether we should place bodily interference of the sort
involved in nonconsensual neurocorrectives in the cate-
gory of neurointerventions which express such
subjectivity-independent disrespect. At least some com-
parable forms of bodily interference—such as that in-
volved in forcibly administering vaccinations as part of
pandemic control—seem to express no significant dis-
respect, or at least, much less than moderate non-public
flogging, which, it seems to me, is disrespectful primar-
ily because it involves intentional infliction of pain.
Shaw suggests that there is in fact one respect in
which nonconsensual neurocorrectives express greater
disrespect than flogging:
Arguably, the forced injection with a mind-
altering drug would even involve an additional
kind of disrespect that is not present in the flog-
ging example. The injection sends out the mes-
sage that the offender’s moral motivation is so
deficient that it needs to be directly re-engineered.
In contrast, flogging engages the offender’s agen-
cy as it is – either by providing him with a pru-
dential reason to refrain from reoffending, if it is
administered as a deterrent, or by responding in a
retributive way to his free choice to do wrong.
The first thing to note here is that, even if Shaw is
correct to think that nonconsensual neurocorrectives
would express this message, they would do so in virtue
of the mental (rather than bodily) interference that they
involve. If nonconsensual neurocorrectives express the
view that the offender is morally deficient, they do so
because of the way in which they intentionally alter the
offender’s mental—and more specifically moral—states
and processes, not in virtue of the fact that they involve
injecting a drug into someone’s body. So Shaw’s objec-
tion here is not an objection to the argument that I
presented in the paper under discussion here [1], which
was concerned only with bodily integrity-based objec-
tions to nonconsensual neurocorrectives.
Second, it is not obvious that expressing the view that
an offender’s moral motivations are deficient, or even so
deficient as to require direct re-engineering, is always
impermissible. Suppose the offender subjected to the
neurocorrective has moral motivations that are so defi-
cient. In that case reasons to be honest with the offender
may require us to express precisely this message. More-
over, expressing the message may in some respects
promote the offender’s wellbeing—for example, by
helping to undermine moral self-deception or grandios-
ity—so we may also have altruistic reasons to express
the message. Finally, insofar as nonconsensual
neurocorrectives can be used as a substitute for incar-
ceration, their use may enable criminal justice systems
to avoid expressing, through incarceration, the message
that offenders are so morally deficient as to require
general exclusion from society—a message that may
seem at least as disrespectful as the message that worries
Shaw.
A General Response to Shaw
To the above specific responses to Shaw’s criticisms, I
would like to add a further, more general response—a
response that, if it succeeds, succeeds in diffusing all of
Shaw’s criticisms, or at least, all of those that take the
problem with nonconsensual neurocorrectives to lie in
their violation of a right to bodily integrity.
In my defence of nonconsensual neurocorrectives
against objections from bodily integrity, I assumed that
nonconsensual neurocorrectives would involve a sub-
stantial degree of physical invasion; I assumed that they
would, like most actual instances of chemical castration,
consist in the injection of a drug. But notice that it is
possible that nonconsensual neurocorrectives could in-
volve lesser degrees of physical invasion. Thus, suppose
that transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) could
be used as a neurocorrective, say by being applied in a
way that tends to suppress extreme impulses towards
violent aggression. tDCS involves administering a very
small electrical current to the brain via electrodes placed
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on the scalp, and it is regarded as one of the most
promising avenues for treating Parkinson’s disease,
among other neurological and psychiatric conditions
[5, 6]. Though there is perhaps a sense in which tDCS
is physically invasive—the electrical current does, after
all, ‘invade’ the brain—it arguably involves a form a
physical invasion that falls outside of the scope of a right
to bodily integrity, or at least infringes on only a very
weak right to bodily integrity. The kind of physical
invasion involved here seems similar to that to which I
subject someone to if I wake her from sleeping by
turning on a light. Just as tDCS results in electrical
energy penetrating a person’s skull, turning on a light
results in electromagnetic radiation penetrating her
skull—the light rays pass through the sleeping person’s
eye lids, cornea and lens and reach her retina, which lies
some distance within the skull. Yet we would hardly
think that turning on a light to wake someone constitutes
a (morally significant) infringement of the right to bodi-
ly integrity. (Of course, a tDCS-based nonconsensual
neurocorrective might involve a morally significant in-
fringement ofmental integrity in a way that turning on a
light does not, but that is not our question.)
This suggests that, even if Shaw is right that noncon-
sensual neurocorrectives that consist in the injection of a
drug are ruled out as impermissible by the right to bodily
integrity (something I should emphasise I still wish to
deny), there may well be other nonconsensual
neurocorrectives that are not so ruled out, because of
the very minor form of bodily interference that they
involve.
Barn’s Reductio
Gulzaar Barn’s response to my paper contains a number
of original and thought-provoking examples, and I am
grateful to her for drawing these to my attention. It also
contains a diverse range of objections, and again, I will
not be able to respond to all of these here. I will focus on
her chief criticism, which is that my argument consti-
tutes a reductio ad absurdum of the permissibility of
minimal incarceration.
As Barn notes, my argument relies on the assumption
that the state may permissibly subject at least some
criminal offenders to minimal incarceration, and that
we might do so as a means to realizing the goal of
rehabilitation, or whatever further goal rehabilitation
serves (e.g. crime prevention, maintenance of security,
or simply prevention of harm) (pp. 105–106). (Recall
that minimal incarceration is a form of incarceration that
involves serious and constant constraints on free move-
ment and association, but otherwise exposes offenders
to no greater risks to their health and security than are
faced by typical members of the unincarcerated citizen-
ry, and under which the state takes all reasonable steps to
safeguard prisoners’ opportunities for political partici-
pation, legal representation and education (p. 105).)
Barn challenges my assumption that minimal incar-
ceration is sometimes permissible. Much of her paper is
devoted to establishing the ineffectiveness of minimal
incarceration in realizing the goals that I attribute to it
and to outlining its great moral costs. Further, she holds
that if my argument succeeds, then the permissibility of
minimal incarceration implies the permissibility of cer-
tain other interventions which seem intuitively abhor-
rent (call these the unacceptable interventions). This,
she suggests, should lead us to reject the permissibility
of minimal incarceration. She holds, then, not only that
minimal incarceration is impermissible, but that my
argument furthers the case against it by generating a
reduction ad absurdum of its permissibility.
Let me begin with a point on which I agree with
Barn: it is not clear or obvious or self-evident that
minimal incarceration is sometimes permissible. I am,
myself, unsure about its permissibility, since I agree
with Barn that it has very great costs both for offenders
and society. I do believe that its permissibility would be
widely accepted (meaning that my argument should
have dialectic force against many) and, independently,
that it is plausible (meaning that its permissibility is
worth entertaining as an ethical hypothesis), and it is
for these reasons it seemed to me legitimate to make my
assumption.3 However, the assumption is only an as-
sumption, and if it turned out to be false this would not
surprise or disappoint me. Nor would it undermine my
conclusion, since that conclusion takes only a
3 Barn speculates that I appeal to the widespread acceptance of the
permissibility of minimal incarceration in motivating my assump-
tion because I believe that its widespread acceptance supports its
plausibility. This is not the case. The fact that a proposition is
widely accepted can give us reasons to subject it to scrutiny and
explore its implications even if it does nothing to increase its
plausibility. For instance, I agree with Barn that (i) the moral
permissibility of the death penalty is widely accepted, though (ii)
it is not plausible. Nevertheless, I believe that the widespread
acceptance of its permissibility could give us dialectic reasons to
subject it to scrutiny and draw out its implications.
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conditional form: ifminimal incarceration is permissible
as a means to realizing the goals that I specified, then
nonconsensual neurocorrectives are not, by reason of
the bodily interference that they involve, impermissible.
Here is another point on which Barn and I agree: if
the permissibility of minimal incarceration indeed im-
plied the acceptability of the unacceptable interventions,
this would give us a strong and probably decisive reason
to reject the permissibility of minimal incarceration.
However, the permissibility of minimal incarceration
does not imply the acceptability of the unacceptable
interventions, or at least, my argument does not support
such an implication. Barn thinks it does because she
attributes to me what she calls the parity claim, accord-
ing to which ‘if incarceration is permissible, then so too
are other interventions that are no more harmful and no
more threatening to agency’. I have two responses. First,
I am not committed to the parity claim. And second,
even if I were, I would not be committed to the moral
permissibility of Barn’s unacceptable interventions.
Let me begin with the second of these responses.
Barn spells out two of her unacceptable interventions.
One of these—let’s call it virtual punishment—is de-
scribed as follows:
Suppose that a new type of punishment was
invented. Here, punishment is simulated as lasting
longer, and a criminal’s own crime is simulated as
being committed against them, in order to induce
empathetic responses, which are said to facilitate
rehabilitation (Barn 2016, this issue).
The second unacceptable intervention, which, fol-
lowing Barn, I will refer to as medical curfew, involves
administering a sleep inducing drug:
let us imagine a medical corrective is invented that
regulates a released criminal’s sleeping patterns,
causing them to sleep for 12 hours of the day.. .
This is implemented with a view to reducing their
involvement in the night-time economy, which for
them, previously involved drugs, gangs, and vio-
lence. With the help of this drug, the criminal will
now arise, like clockwork, at 6am, and experience
12 hours of the day, until around 5pm where they
will start getting tired and prepare themselves for
sleep, and eventually fall fast asleep at 6pm. This
ensures they can no longer be led astray by the
night-time culture that they once used to occupy
(Barn 2016, this issue).
These are ingenious cases, but I think it is doubtful
that the parity claim conjoined with the permissibility of
minimal incarceration implies the permissibility of ei-
ther of the interventions that they describe. In both
cases, it seems plausible that these interventions are
more threating to agency than minimal incarceration.
This is because both involve intentionally interfering
with the minds of offenders in a way that minimal
incarceration arguably does not.
Barn may argue that, if I take this line, then I must
allow, contrary to what I claimed, that nonconsensual
neurocorrectives are also more threatening to agency than
minimal incarceration, because they too involve intention-
al mental interference. However, I do not think I must
allow this. There are features of virtual punishment and
medical curfew which lead me to think that these involve
especially problematic forms of mental interference—
forms that nonconsensual neurocorrectives certainly need
not involve. For instance, virtual punishment presumably
involves the intentional infliction of pain or suffering (this,
I take it, is why Barn refers to it as a punishment), whilst
medical curfew involves agential capacitation—it pre-
vents the offender from exercising his agency. Noncon-
sensual neurocorrectives need involve neither.
Moreover, even if nonconsensual neurocorrectives
are more threatening to agency than minimal incarcera-
tion in virtue of the kind of mental interference that they
involve, this is perfectly compatible with my argument,
which concerned only bodily integrity. I claimed only
that nonconsensual neurocorrectives are not more harm-
ful or more threatening to agency than incarceration in
virtue of the kind of bodily interference that they involve
(viz. the injection of a safe drug) and I used this to
support the conclusion that, if minimal incarceration is
permissible, then medical correctives are not impermis-
sible in virtue of violating a right to bodily integrity.
These claims are consistent with medical correctives
being more threatening to agency or harmful in virtue
of their mental effects and with their being impermissi-
ble for this reason, and indeed I explicitly allude to this
possibility at the end of the paper.
Thus, even if I were committed to the parity claim, I
would not be committed to the permissibility of Barn’s
unacceptable interventions. In fact, however, I am not
committed to the parity claim. Indeed, it is unclear why
Barn attributes it to me, since I do not explicitly defend
it. Perhaps she thinks it is the only way I can reason from
the claim that
Nonconsensual Neurocorrectives and Bodily Integrity
(1) Interference with bodily integrity of the sort in-
volved in nonconsensual neurocorrectives (viz.
the injection of a drug) is not necessarily or even
typically more harmful or more threatening to
agency than the interference with freedom of
movement and association involved in minimal
incarceration
To my tentative conclusion that
(2) The right to bodily integrity of the sort at involved
i n t h e impo s i t i o n o f n o n c o n s e n s u a l
neurocorrectives is not more robust than the rights
to freedom of movement and association at in-
volved in the imposition of minimal incarceration.
Barn may take me to be implicitly appealing here to
the view that
(3) Some right, r1, can be more robust than some other
right r2 only if interferences of the sort ruled out by
r1 are more harmful or more threatening to agency
than interferences of the sort ruled out by r2.
Claim (3) brings us fairly close to the parity claim. It
may imply that, if minimal incarceration is permissible
despite the restrictions on freedom of movement and
association that it involves, there can be no decisive
rights-based objection to any interference i that is no more
harmful or threatening to agency than minimal incarcera-
tion. This is because any rights that protect against i
would, in that case, be no more robust than the rights to
free movement and association involved in minimal in-
carceration, and those rights are, by assumption, insuffi-
ciently robust to create a decisive objection to such incar-
ceration. Thus, there will arguably be no decisive rights-
based objection to i, and if we add the assumption that
there is no decisive non-rights-based objection to i, then
we are forced to conclude that i must be permissible.
I do not defend or rely on (3), however. (3) holds that
only differences in harmfulness or threat to agency can
justify differences in the robustness of rights, but I hold
only that such differences provide two possible ways of
justifying such a difference. I allow that there may also
be other ways of justifying this difference,4 and indeed I
explicitly consider one in my article: one might appeal
to intuitions regarding the moral permissibility of the
kinds of interferences against which the rights protect.
For reasons I gave in my article (pp. 111–13), I do not
believe that an appeal to intuition can succeed in
explaining why rights to bodily integrity of the sort at
stake in nonconsensual neurocorrectives are more ro-
bust than rights to freedom of movement of the sort at
stake in minimal incarceration. But it is perfectly possi-
ble that such an appeal might succeed in showing that
some other rights at stake in, for instance, Barn’s unac-
ceptable interventions, are more robust.
Further Brief Responses to Barn
The reductio described above is the core of Barn’s
argument, but she also makes a number of ancillary
criticisms, and in this final section, I would like to
respond briefly to five of these.
The first criticism concerns the orientation of my
article towards the consent requirement, according to
which neurocorrectives may permissibly be imposed on
offenders only with their valid consent. I attributed this
requirement to a number of other authors, and presented
my own argument as an argument against it. Moreover,
my argument begins from the rejection of an analogous
requirement in relation to minimal incarceration; as
discussed above, I assume that minimal incarceration
can sometimes permissibly be imposed evenwithout the
valid consent of the offender.
Barn worries that, in motivating my assumption that
minimal incarceration is sometimes permissible, I give
too much weight to the rejection of a consent require-
ment in relation to such incarceration:
The reason that we incarcerate criminals. .. isn’t
because we think it permissible to do anything to
them without their consent, or because the Consent
Requirement simply no longer holds for them in
light of their offending. Rather, it is because of the
particular aim of punishment that incarceration is
intended to serve, be that rehabilitative, retributive
or deterrent. This aim, whatever it may be, is what
grounds the justifiability of incarceration. Consid-
er; prisoners on America’s death row aren’t mur-
dered because, or, for the reason that, their consent
is violable. Rather, it is because of the intended
retributive and deterrent effects (as unfounded as
they may be) that this punishment is purportedly
4 There may also be a difference in robustness though there is no
way of justifying it.
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justified. That prisoners’ consent is violated in the
process, is a corollary, or parallel effect, of the
primary aims and justifications of the punishment.
It is not the case that they become liable to punish-
ment because of the violability of the Consent
Requirement. Therefore, it does not seem enough
to argue that the violability of their consent is what
grounds another form of punishment (Barn 2016,
this issue).
I agree with all of this and did not endorse the view
that minimal incarceration is permissible only because
there is no requirement to obtain valid consent before
imposing it. Obviously, as Barn suggests here, a consent
requirement is just one possible constraint on the per-
missibility of minimal incarceration. Its absence will not
demonstrate the permissibility of such incarceration un-
less there is something to be said in its favour. This is
where the goals of incarceration come in. It is precisely
because the goals of incarceration are relevant to its
justification that I took care to clarify my assumptions
regarding those goals (p. 106).
Barn’s second ancillary criticism focusses on just
those assumptions. As noted above, I assumed that both
min ima l inca rce ra t i on and nonconsensua l
neurocorrectives would be administered for the pur-
poses of facilitating offender rehabilitation, or whatever
further goal rehabilitation serves (these further goals
might include crime prevention, maintenance of securi-
ty, or simply prevention of harm). Barn worries that this
appeal to the ‘further goals’ of rehabilitation involves
excessively broadening the concept of rehabilitation:
Douglas argues that two other goals of incarcera-
tion, incapacitation and deterrence, are also
Bcommonly thought to serve the same higher ob-
jective as rehabilitation: namely, the prevention of
crime or, more generally, the maintenance of
security.^ [Barn’s emphasis] This seems to prob-
lematically broaden the idea of ‘rehabilitation,’
however, and leads to the unpalatable conclusion
that almost anything that fulfils these expansive
goals can be done under the banner of rehabilita-
tion (Barn 2016, this issue).
But there is no broadening of the concept of rehabil-
itation here. Rehabilitation remains a term for one way
in which we seek to prevent crime or maintain security. I
do not ‘define’ rehabilitation as crime prevention, as
Barn later states, indeed I keep the them clearly distinct;
I simply recognize that rehabilitation may be sought
only as a means to the further goal of crime prevention.
Barn’s third ancillary criticism targets my assump-
tion, for the sake of argument, that we have at our
disposal neurointerventions that are effective as aids to
offender rehabilitation. Barn objects:
It is no good to assume for the sake of argument
that such drugs will aid rehabilitation. Whether
such drugs really can facilitate rehabilitation is
inextricably and interdependently tied up with
their permissibility.[Barn’s emphasis] Indeed,
whether such drugs would actually aid rehabilita-
tion, and so be permissible, depends on how reha-
bilitation itself is defined, and what it is theorised
to consist in (Barn 2016, this issue).
I agree that the permissibility of neurocorrectives will
depend on their effectiveness; if I did not, then I would
not have made any assumption regarding their effective-
ness. However, I do not see how this undermines the
legitimacy of my assumption. The very purpose of
making such assumptions is to hold some determinants
of permissibility fixed so that we can examine others. As
noted above, I wished in this paper to specifically ex-
amine bodi ly integr i ty-based object ions to
neurocorrectives, so it is natural that I should want to
exclude effectiveness-based objections from the scope
of my discussion.5
A fourth ancillary criticism is that I appear to suc-
cumb to a kind of neural determinism according to
which criminality is wholly determined by brain states
and not at all by social factors. Barn tentatively attributes
this view to me on the basis that my argument requires
that criminal behavior is under the influence of neural
dispositions, and that I nowhere either (i) explicitly
endorse a mixed view according to which social factors
also influence criminal behavior, or (ii) discuss any such
social factors.
In fact, I domention one important social risk factor for
criminal behaviour—incarceration, which I note can have
a criminogenic effect—and the reason I do not mention
more is simply that my paper is addressed to the contro-
versial question whether we should use biological influ-
ences to prevent recidivism, not to the (I take it uncontro-
versial) proposition that we should use social influences to
5 Perhaps my assumption would be problematic if it could be
shown that we never will have effective neurocorrectives, but Barn
does not establish this.
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do so. Given this aim, social influences on crime are,
though powerful, irrelevant to my argument.
What is my actual view on the role of neural and
social factors in generating crime? I do not have a well-
developed position and am in fact not sure that the
distinction is a perspicuous one, since presumably the
influence of social factors on our conduct is, like all
influences on our minds, in some why mediated by the
neural states on which our minds supervene (I am not a
mind-body dualist). However, my undeveloped view is
that both biological and social influences play an impor-
tant and interacting role in influencing criminality.
Finally, Barn objects to what she sees as my confla-
tion of morality with criminality:
The language used in the paper, such as the inten-
tion that the Bpost-rehabilitation offender will be a
morally better person,^ [Barn’s emphasis] con-
flates morality with criminality, and posits crimi-
nals as morally deficient, as a general class, in
virtue of their offending (Barn 2016, this issue).
Here I need to explain the context of the passage which
Barn quotes. This passage concerned the definition of
rehabilitation. I was speculating that one (though not the
only) way of defining rehabilitation is as a kind of moral
improvement. On this conception of rehabilitation, it is by
definition the case that a successful rehabilitation pro-
gramme results in a morally better person. I did also later
suppose that rehabilitationmight be pursued as ameans to
the prevention of recidivism, and if we understand reha-
bilitation to consist in moral improvement, such an inten-
tion would be legitimate only if there is some sort of
relationship—though possibly a rather loose one—be-
tween at least some forms of immorality and criminality.
However, the existence of such a relationship is very
plausible, and assuming such a relationship does not
amount to a conflation of the two concepts. Nor does it
imply that criminals are ‘morally deficient, as a general
class, in virtue of their offending’. The suggestions that
rehabilitation might consist in moral improvement and
might be pursued in part for the purpose of crime preven-
tion are perfectly consistent with the view that some
offenders are morally normal individuals placed in
crime-promoting social circumstances. With respect to
those offenders, criminal rehabilitation could then be un-
derstood as a way of conferring a kind of moral
enhancement on offenders in order to inoculate them
against such crime-promoting social factors.
I should emphasise, however, that I am in fact not
sure that we ought to understand rehabilitation such that
it consists in moral improvement. This is why I held
open also the possibility that we ought to understand it
more ‘thinly’ as simply becoming less likely to re-of-
fend. It is also why I eschewed the terms ‘moral im-
provement’ and ‘moral enhancement’ as general labels
for the kinds of interventions that I wished to examine.
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